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dualism in Mozambique
Lídia Cabral
Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the latest mechanisation programme by the
Mozambican government, asking how it is politically driven and
how it shapes and is shaped by agrarian structures. Old ideas
about agrarian dualism are reproduced today, albeit with a new
language of public-private partnerships that are seen as
potentially driving the modernisation of the peasantry. State-
sponsored and privately-run service centres, featuring zinc roofed
warehouses, are the government’s preferred route to
modernisation, yet failing to reach the average farmer and
understanding the motives and predicaments of private
managers. Emerging small to medium farmers, who keep tractors
under shady mango trees in their backyards, are also offering
mechanisation services to their peers, which are instrumental to
stepping up their production and commercial activities. The
state’s push for mechanisation feeds uneven patterns of







In 2015, the government of Mozambique (GoM) launched the National Agriculture
Mechanisation Programme, which, in line with its agricultural development strategy
(Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento do Sector Agrário, know as PEDSA), aimed to
increase agricultural production and productivity (MINAG 2011). By 2018, the pro-
gramme had established 96 Agrarian Service Centres (Centros de Serviços Agrários,
CSAs) across the country for the provision of mechanisation services to farmers. Of
this total, 27 CSAs were managed by government agencies and 69 by private
operators, selected to enter public-private partnerships (PPP). The CSAs were
equipped with machinery imported from Brazil, mainly tractors and implements for
ploughing, bought with a concessional loan provided by the Brazilian government
(Cabral et al. 2016). The loan was part of a South-South cooperation programme
between Brazil and five African countries (Mozambique, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and
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Zimbabwe), with a stated aim of improving food security through small-scale farm
mechanisation.1
The renewed interest in agricultural mechanisation, noticeable not only in Mozambique
but also across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), prompted academic and policy discussions about
what would be suitable types and sources of technology and about effective channels for
supply of machinery and mechanisation services. Were economic and structural conditions
(such as relative factor prices and farm sizes) now suitable for mechanisation (Diao et al.
2014), contrary to previously found for the SSA region (Binswanger and Pingali 1988)?
Were technology and know-how originating from other Southern countries more adequate
to theneedsofAfrican agriculture (Cabral 2016; Agyei-Holmes 2014)?What roles for the state
and for the private sector in supplying machinery and delivering mechanisation services
(Daum and Birner 2017)? And how important was it to consider the scale of technology if
state policy was to benefit primarily the majority of the (smallholder) farming population –
should small engines rather than tractors be prioritised (Biggs and Justice 2015)?
These questions revived old disputes on the case for mechanisation in SSA, which had
both ideological and technocratic contours (cf. overview paper in this special forum). In
Mozambique, they recalled passionate debates held immediately after Independence in
the 1970s on whether farm mechanisation would assist or hinder the socialist revolution
of the countryside. Back then, the links between farm mechanisation, agrarian structures
and class relations had been emphasised (O’Laughlin 1996; Wuyts 1981) to suggest that
government options for mechanisation were not simply a technocratic matter. These
options were instead fundamentally political. The politics of mechanisation concerned
both deliberations on the agrarian structures to privilege (the peasantry, state farms or
the enterprise sector) as well as the international partners to favour as technology provi-
ders (China, Soviet Union or Western countries).
The politics of mechanisation today have much in common with the dynamics of the
past, as I will illustrate in this paper. Focusing on the recent mechanisation programme
that emerged out of Brazilian South-South cooperation, I describe the approach followed
by the GoM and analyse similarities and differences relative to that previous experience. I
discuss the role played by mechanisation in the interplay between state, business and
other actors, in relation to processes of agrarian change and accumulation (Borras 2009).
The roleof the state indrivingagriculturalmechanisation and influencing agrarian change
and accumulation is a central aspect ofmy analysis.While state power andmediationmaybe
needed to resolve the agrarian question (Byres 2009), the co-optation of state institutions by
narrow (agrarian) class interests may subvert such objectives (Hall 2011), as likely the case in
Mozambique todaywhere the rulingelite controls access to resources andeconomicbenefits
to achieve narrow and short-term gains rather than inclusive and longer-term goals
(Macuane, Buur, and Monjane 2018). Furthermore, the state’s tendency to simplify
complex reality to render it legible (Scott 1998) undermines its ability to put forward appro-
priate support programmes. And yet, the extent to which top-down state interventions can
have ameaningful impact on the ground has been questioned by Berry’s (1993) work on the
social dynamics of agrarian change in SSA. She argues that agrarian change is an ongoing
process and hegemonic impositions from above are resisted and adapted by the people.
1Cabral et al. (2016) discuss the motivations of Brazilian government and private sectors for supporting this programme
and competing understandings of the programme’s purpose on the Brazilian side.
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So, while seeking to understand the state’s drive and motivations, I also interrogate the
extent to which policy interventions such as the mechanisation programme have the
intended impact or whether unforeseen changes occur. Within this broad interest on
state and agrarian change in processes of mechanisation, four questions guide my analy-
sis. What motivations and visions of agricultural development drive the present mechan-
isation programme of the GoM? How do these differ from past mechanisation strategies?
Who wins and who loses from the current strategy? How is mechanisation shaping and
being shaped by agrarian structures and accumulation in the Mozambican countryside?
Three main findings emerge from my analysis. One is that the mechanisation pro-
gramme exposes the GoM’s dualistic understanding of the agricultural economy and
agrarian structures, which separates the peasantry from the enterprise private sector,
and persists since the period after Independence (O’Laughlin 1996). This dualistic
framing drives the GoM’s strategy of mobilising presumably efficient and financially sus-
tainable private operators to offer mechanisation services to the peasantry and assist their
modernisation.
The other key finding relates to Berry’s (1993) thesis specifically. Two concurrent chan-
nels of service provision are discernible in connection to the GoM’s programme. One,
which I playfully call the ‘zinc roof’ channel, is the result of the government’s deliberate
choice of the entrepreneurial sector as the preferred route for mechanisation service
delivery; it reflects an updated version of dualism that sees the state as a partner of the
entrepreneurial private sector. The other channel, which I refer to as the ‘mango tree’
channel, results from the ongoing agrarian dynamics, specifically the emergence of capi-
talised small- to medium-scale farmers from within the peasantry with capacity to take on
mechanisation service provision in their own hands. Yet, in line with Berry’s analysis, the
zinc-roof channel is not working as the GoM intended and the unforeseen mango tree
channel is not the making of GoM and appears to be better geared to reach out to the
peasantry, while contributing to their differentiation.
The third finding is that these two channels represent parallel paths of accumulation
which the GoM’s subsidised tractors help to feed. Borrowing from Mamdani’s (1987)
analysis of social differentiation in agrarian societies, two paths are discernible – the
zinc roof channel represents ‘accumulation from above’, resulting from the GoM’s favour-
ing of the entrepreneurial sector, comprising large farms and established businesses,
some of them with direct links to the state as well as international capital; the mango
tree channel embodies ‘accumulation from below’, in that increasing capitalised small-
to-medium scale farmers draw on subsidised tractors and their social networks to step
up their agricultural production and commercial activities.
My analysis draws on secondary literature on mechanisation history, a review of gov-
ernment policy documents and recent studies on mechanisation (e.g. Dada, Nova, and
Carlos 2017), and fieldwork conducted between March 2017 and July 2018 in Mozambi-
que. I selected two farming regions with established CSAs as fieldwork case studies. One
of the study’s sites, the district of Chókwè, was selected for being a priority area of the
mechanisation programme and therefore having a particularly dense geographical con-
centration of newly established CSAs (MASA 2017),2 which maximised opportunities for
2Seven new CSAs were established in Chókwè, whereas for other districts the number varies between one and three new
centres (MASA 2017).
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data collection. The district is situated in the Southern province of Gaza and is well known
for its irrigation infrastructure dating back to the colonial period, which covers an area of
30,000 hectares and irrigates rice and horticulture fields. The relatively high concentration
of CSAs in Chókwè reflects the fact that this is an established farming region with a long
history of aid-supported state investments. The other study site was the Nacala corridor,
an area spanning five provinces and several districts in the North of Mozambique (MASA
2015). The Nacala corridor was chosen for being the locus of land based conflicts and an
area of potential expansion of large-scale and export-oriented agriculture (UNAC and
GRAIN 2015; Shankland and Gonçalves 2016; Monjane and Bruna 2020). This provided
an interesting backdrop to analyse the motivations of government as well as private part-
ners in relation to a programme advertised as geared towards small-scale farmers while
prioritising high potential farming areas. In the Nacala corridor, I conducted fieldwork
in four districts within the province of Nampula: Malema, Meconta, Monapo and Ribáuè.
Qualitative data was collected through semi-structured interviews with key informants,
including CSA managers, private sector operators involved in mechanisation services
(including SOTEMA, the company responsible for distributing and servicing the machinery
under the mechanisation programme), government officials at national and district levels,
former civil servants involved in past mechanisation programmes, medium and small-scale
peasant farmers, farmer associations and their members. Although my sampling strategy
was guided by the location of CSAs, I looked at the wider network of tractor procurement
and use, which allowed me to identify the protagonists of the ‘mango tree’model and their
peer-to-peer rental arrangements. Fieldwork also included field observation, comprising
visits to CSA infrastructures (comprising 8 private and 2 public CSAs) and to farming
areas while mechanising services were ongoing. Data generated included details on CSA
infrastructures and machinery, transcripts from recorded interviews, interview notes from
non-recorded interviews and notes from field observation. Content analysis was used to
identify emerging themes, including: CSA manager profiles and their connections to
other activities (farming or otherwise), understandings of the PPP and of CSA roles by
GoM and by CSA private managers, service delivery experiences and challenges, access
to services by peasant farmers, and peer-to-peer arrangement.
After this introduction, I briefly review the history of mechanisation in Mozambique,
focusing on the period immediately after Independence and the current mechanisation
programme. I then look at this programme in detail, discussing the state-business inter-
action in PPPs, access to the programme by the average farmer, and patterns of accumu-
lation nurtured by state-driven mechanisation.
Agricultural mechanisation in Mozambique: past and present
Low levels of mechanisation
The short-handled hoe (enxada de cabo curto, in Portuguese) remains the main tool used
by Mozambique’s predominantly small-scale subsistence farmers. About 97% of pro-
duction comes from rain-fed agriculture practised in plots with an average size of 1.2 hec-
tares, with minimum input use and virtually no mechanisation (CGAP 2016; MASA 2016).
According to the 2009–10 agricultural census, only 1.6% of farmers use tractors, 0.3% use
trailers and 0.2% use motorised water pumps (MASA 2011). Animal traction is also
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generally low in the country (under 10%), except in areas not affected by animal sleeping
sickness (MASA 2016).
Although official data on machinery stocks or tractors in use are not readily available,
one estimate puts the current stock of tractors (of under 100 horsepower, or hp) at 1500–
2000. These are used not only in agriculture but also in road maintenance and rubbish
collection.3 Historical records for tractor imports give an indication of Mozambique’s
low levels of mechanisation in relation to other African countries in the post-colonial
period (Figure 1).
Mechanisation after independence: tractors and a dualistic policy framework
At Independence, in 1975, Mozambique’s agrarian structures included three farm types:
large plantation farms (particularly for sugar, copra, tea and sisal) owned by foreign
capital; medium-scale colonist farms owned by Portuguese farmers; and small-scale
peasant family-based units, who produced most of the country’s cashew (an export
crop) and maize, as well as other staple food crops (Hanlon 1978; Wardman 1985). Mech-
anisation was a feature of most plantation farms and some colonist farms. According to
one estimate, there were 4500 tractors and a few dozen combine harvests across the
country before Independence (Hanlon 1978). At Independence, Portuguese farmers,
who produced much of the food for urban consumption, fled the country and many
destroyed farm infrastructures and machinery as they left.
As the Frelimo-led socialist government took office, most land that had been under
colonist farms gave way to state farms. These were regarded as the quickest way of
addressing food shortages, besides providing the basis for developing a working class,
which the country lacked and was at the core of the Marxism-Leninism the government
had embraced. State farms inherited colonial machinery stocks and although new
machinery imports declined sharply in those early years, they gradually picked up in
the late 1970s, though never near pre-Independence levels (Figure 2).
Figure 1. Tractor imports in Ghana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, 1961–2007 (Y = units). Source: Com-
piled by the author with data from FAOSTAT.
3Interview with leading Mozambican agriculture machinery trader and former government official working on state-run
mechanisation programme (Maputo, March 2017).
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In 1977, the first public tender for mechanisation of independent Mozambique was
launched with support from Italy, Sweden and other countries. Procured machinery origi-
nated from Western partners and included brands such as Massey Ferguson (Hanlon
1978). More machinery arrived in the early 1980s, this time funded by Eastern partners,
such as the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and East Germany, which provided their own brands.4
The newly constituted state farms were their main destination. Some machinery was
distributed to machinery stations, which the Portuguese had set up during the colonial
period and were now managed by the state.5 A state company, MECANAGRO E.E., was
created to support mechanisation, including importing new machinery, managing
stocks and providing services to farmers (Mosca 2011). It operated machinery stations
and sold services to state companies, emerging co-operatives and some large farms
that remained under private management after Independence, particularly in the sugar
sector. Chókwè became the country’s most mechanised district and the place where
the largest tractors could be found (some as big as 300 HP). By 1982, there were report-
edly 5000 tractors in the country, though far below the estimate of 40,000 tractors
thought to be needed at the time (Hanlon 1978).
The option for mechanisation was contested and exposed fractures within the govern-
ment’s socialist strategy for agriculture. In 1977, at the Third Congress of the Frelimo
party,6 the government announced its agricultural policy and put the emphasis on
state farms, while diminishing the importance of communal land and co-operatives
that had been at the core Frelimo’s initial revolutionary vision (Wuyts 1981). This had
centred on the creation of communal villages, of the type pursued in neighbouring Tan-
zania by President Julius Nyerere (1968), and where production was to be organised
around agricultural co-operatives. Harris (1980) describes the process leading to that
earlier recognition of communal farming at the core of the Frelimo socialist revolution,
Figure 2. Tractor imports in Mozambique, 1961–2001 (Y = units). Source: Produced by the author with
data from FAOSTAT.
Notes: The series stops in 2001 for Mozambique, and the FAO series for mechanisation stopped being compiled
altogether in 2008, reflecting, as remarked by Biggs and Justice (2015), reduced interest in the topic since the mid-
1990s. The apparent downward trend since 2016 may reflect the country’s severe debt crisis the country has been
facing and the consequent slowdown in foreign direct investment and trade.
4Interviews with two informants who were closely involved in mechanisation policy during the first decade of the post-
Independence period (Maputo, March 2018).
5Interviews with two informants who were closely involved in mechanisation policy during the first decade of the post-
Independence period (Maputo, March 2018).
6This was the first held after Independence and hence a milestone in setting the tone and direction of the new regime.
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formalised in a Resolution approved at the 8th Session of the Central Committee of
Frelimo in 1976:
The Resolution set out the guidelines for the development of the economic and social
structure of communal villages. At the economic level the Resolution stated that the
material base will be a co-operative or state farm, but emphasised only the former and
in defining it linked its economic aspects within the ‘political, social and cultural
aspects’ of village development. It also indicated that the co-operative’s and communal
village’s production techniques should be labour-intensive and that within the aim of
‘self-reliance’ production should be oriented towards direct consumption as well as mar-
ketable surpluses. (339)
Yet, by the time of the 1977 Congress, the turn towards state companies and machines
(rather than labour) was obvious:
The state-owned enterprises are the quickest means of responding to the country’s food
requirements because of the size of the areas they cover, their rational organization of
human and material resources, and the immediate availability of machinery. They will form
centres for research and development of agrarian techniques and science. (Central Commit-
tee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO, cited by Harris [1980, 340])
A news piece published by The Washington Post in 1978 describes cleavages inside gov-
ernment and the Frelimo party regarding technology choices (Ottaway 1978). The dispute
was reportedly between Soviet-leaning party members, favouring mechanisation for
large-scale state farms, and China-influenced members, preferring labour-intensive tech-
nologies centred on ‘people’s power’. There were concerns that tractors were not suitable
for small farms and calls for more appropriate technology, such as animal traction, ade-
quate ploughs and storage facilities (Hanlon 1978).
The dispute eventually led to the sacking of the Minister of Agriculture, presumably
because of his failure to support communal villages. And yet, support to state farms
and tractorisation continued (O’Laughlin 1996), while communal villages and intermedi-
ate technologies failed to emerge as an alternative to Soviet-style development, which
would soon reveal its own shortcomings.
A few years later, Wuyts (1981) criticised the option for tractors as driven by political
considerations that overlooked Mozambique’s material conditions, where rural labour
was abundant and labour-intensive farming was the most suitable option until industri-
alisation started absorbing it and raising rural wages.
The concrete conditions of the present phase, however, are not constituted by the necessity
to release labour from agriculture so as to enable industrialization, but rather to cope with a
severe crisis of the colonial economic structures (…). The question today is not to ‘release’
labour but to ‘absorb’ it within agriculture so as to prevent the deepening of the crisis of
the peasantry. (14)
But, as Berry (1993) would later argue, technological choices in agriculture cannot be
reduced to production factor proportions alone, but ‘must be understood in relation to
changes in the organization of agricultural production and specific regional configur-
ations of economic, political, and social change’ (183). In Mozambique, the way is
which mechanisation was framed in dualistic terms, or in relation to labour abundance,
simplified the reality on the ground and overlooked the ways in which machinery was
used and appropriated locally.
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Analysing experiences with farmers’ co-operatives in Mozambique, Harris (1980) illus-
trates how the social structures idealised by the co-operative model (where co-operative
members were expected to emerge from a group of poor landless and exploited peasants
within the village) contrasted with reality where social differentiation was shaped by class
stratification and livelihood diversification strategies. Often, active co-operative members
were rich peasant farmers within the village who had accumulated wealth during the
colonial period and retained individual family plots on the side of communal land.
They exploited labour and reinvested accumulated income in means of production,
including tractors, which only a few accessed. Some co-operatives emerged hence as
capitalistic enterprises dominated by a small group of farmers and were not the
village-wide mechanism of cooperation between poor peasants and exploited labour
that Frelimo had idealised. This ideal was part of a distorted dualistic perspective on agrar-
ian class structures that regarded the peasantry as a homogeneous sector of society and
opposed to an enterprise sector, which was now in the hands of the state (O’Laughlin
1996).
Likewise, the reality of state farms did not conform with Frelimo’s ideal type of agro-
industrial complexes absorbing a large reserve of waged labour and addressing the coun-
try’s food needs. Instead, state farms struggled to hire labour (competing with peasant
farms) and managed inputs efficiently, failing to meet their production targets or the
broader proletarisation mission. Yet, they played a role in local capital accumulation to
the extent that their managers and most skilled workers ‘used their connections to buy
or acquire inputs through the state farm for use on their own farms or for resale’ (O’Laugh-
lin 1996, 23). Production targets were kept artificially high by managers as these were
linked to supplies of means of production (including tractors) and fuel they could draw
on. State farms became hence a ‘nucleus of private accumulation of capital, either as com-
mercial producers or in speculative trade’ (23)
The ways in which co-operatives and state farms failed to conform with the idealised
dualistic framework of the Frelimo government illustrate Berry’s argument that state inter-
ference in the countryside is never hegemonic or truly transformative. Capitalist patterns
of accumulation, with their roots in the colonial period (through consolidation of class
strata and labour relations), may have been slightly disrupted by socialism but got
quickly reconfigured in the ways co-operative members and state farm managers appro-
priated resources and available technology for private gain.
Meanwhile, the circumstances of Mozambique’s state-run agricultural sector and its
mechanisation strategy deteriorated significantly throughout the 1980s not only by fail-
ings of the model but also because of civil war. Poor management of MECANAGRO and
the widespread collapse of state companies at a time of conflict7 led to the end of the
mechanisation company and the abandonment of the mechanisation strategy, alongside
the extensive withdrawal of the state from agriculture, much as it happened throughout
Africa. This process was accelerated by the Structural Adjustment Programme, overseen
by the Bretton Woods institutions, which regarded the state as inefficient and sought
to dismantle it and make way for a private sector-led transformation (Harrison 1994).
7Interview with Joseph Hanlon (Maputo, March 2018). Hanlon highlighted the devastating impact of the war on the
Mozambican countryside during the 1980s, where state farms and farm machinery were frequent targets of attacks
by opposition Renamo forces.
8 L. CABRAL
Yet, shortages of capital meant that there was no substantive private sector to take the
state’s place in Mozambique. The consequence was a vacuum in the countryside where
farmers were left without mechanisation services or indeed other services or organised
markets for their produce. The international aid sector eventually filled some of gaps, par-
ticularly with extension, input supply and market support initiatives operationalised by
non-governmental organisations, but mechanisation remained off the radar for many
years.8
The recent revival of mechanisation
Mechanisation re-emerged as a salient topic in recent years, reigniting debates about
development pathways and agrarian change, in Mozambique as well as in other SSA
countries. Organisations such as the African Union (AU), the African Development Bank
(ADB), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the Food and
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) have explicitly renewed their commitment towards mech-
anisation as part of their support to Africa’s agricultural transformation (African Develop-
ment Bank 2016; Ahmed 2015). It has been noted that ‘the dream to have a hunger-free
Africa by 2025 would remain a mirage without mechanization’ (FAO Regional Office for
Africa 2016, para. 6).
In Mozambique, the rise in machinery imports has been noticeable in recent years
(Figure 3). Countries like South Africa, China, the United Kingdom, the United States,
Japan, and Brazil are amongst the sources of imports.9 Turkey, India and South
Korea have also reportedly approached the GoM for mechanisation-focused aid and
trade.10
The rise in imports is aligned with GoM’s emphasis on agricultural modernisation. Fol-
lowing the endorsement of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Pro-
gramme in 2003, the government pledged to increase spending in agriculture and help
raise production and productivity. Mechanisation is part of a strategy to modernise and
transform the peasantry (MINAG 2011). The National Policy for Agricultural Mechanis-
ation, launched in 2015, is one component of such strategy (MASA 2017). Other com-
ponents include investment in storage and input supply facilities in high potential
farming areas, and partnerships with the private sector for the management of these gov-
ernment-sponsored infrastructures and services.
The government’s assumption is that, in contrast with the past, when state-run services
failed to become financially sustainable, the private sector can make mechanisation work
and thereby assist the modernisation of the sector, transform the peasantry, and increase
food production and the productivity and market competitiveness of Mozambican agri-
cultural commodities. Despite the ideological differences between the Frelimo-led gov-
ernment of now and then, a similar dualistic vision of agriculture is reproduced by the
current logic – the modern entrepreneurial sector, though still guided by the state
(who sponsored the zinc-roofed service centres), takes the lead in service provision
(much like state farms previously had) so that the peasantry can catch up.
8Interview with former civil servant and currently business entrepreneur in the field of mechanisation services (Maputo,
March 2018)
9Based on data from the Mozambican Institute of National Statistics, INE.
10Interview with FDA (Maputo, March 2018).
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The next section reviews the GoM’s mechanisation strategy in detail. The conditions
under which dualism are reproduced come to light in subsequent sections. Berry’s argu-
ment about the limits of the state’s hegemony is revealed by the ways in which the gov-
ernment’s mechanisation programme is appropriated by agribusinesses and farmers alike.
Agrarian service centres: visions and model
Brazilian machinery: for family farmers?
The launch of the mechanisation programme by GoM in 2015 was prompted by the arrival
of farming machinery from Brazil, funded by the South-South cooperation programme
known as More Food International. This was one of the largest agriculture mechanisation
initiatives in Mozambique in recent years, amounting to a concessional loan of US$98
million for machinery procurement plus in-kind technical cooperation.11
The Brazilian government led by President Lula da Silva and the Workers’ Party had,
over the period 2003–10, significantly increased support to the family farming sector in
Brazil and put forward several policies targeting this sector. These included credit pro-
vision to assist the mechanisation of family farms, which was part of a domestic initiative
called More Food programme (Patriota and Pierri 2013). The Brazilian Ministry of Agrarian
Development (MDA), which had overseen these policies in Brazil, eventually became
involved in international cooperation and incorporated its domestic experiences in
Brazil’s cooperation portfolio, seeking to project its political agenda abroad, both as
part of a South-South solidarity and to strengthen the family farming agenda domestically
vis-à-vis the dominant large-scale agribusiness (Cabral et al. 2016). Yet, More Food Inter-
national mobilised a broader set of interests beyond MDA, including the Brazilian indus-
try, seeking to promote machinery sales in Africa.
Political changes in Brazil led to the dismantling of MDA and the gradual withdrawal of
programmes directed to family farmers, domestically and abroad. MFI ended up solely
centred on machinery sales, and the connection with the political dimension of the
Figure 3. Imports of tractors and other farming machinery and equipment, 2001–17 (Y=1000 US$).
Source: Produced by the author with data from Mozambican National Statistics Institute.
Notes: Data for 2017 is preliminary. Other machinery and equipment include ploughs, seeders, fertiliser distributors,
combine harvesters and threshers.
11See Cabral et al. (2016) for further details on this programme and a discourse-politics analysis of its genesis and early
years, as the programme travelled from Brazil to Africa.
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family farming agenda that had initially driven the programme was eventually lost.
Besides Brazil’s domestic politics, a major factor contributing to the erosion of the
family farming agenda in MFI was lack of interest by the GoM. Rather than the social
and political reproduction of the family sector advocated by the Brazilian MDA, GoM envi-
saged the transformation of the peasantry into competitive commercial farmers, through
mechanisation and access to modern inputs and other services.
By early 2015 the first (and at the time of fieldwork still only) consignment of machinery
arrived in Mozambique (MDA 2015). The package was supplied by three machinery com-
panies in Brazil: LS Mtron (a South Korean brand with a factory in Brazil) supplied 513 trac-
tors model LS Plus 80, and Tatu Marchesan and Triton supplied a range of tractor
implements and other equipment (2623 items in total). These brands were new to
Mozambique and hence there were no local brand representations. Incidentally, this
would prove to be a challenge for timely and affordable access to spare parts and tech-
nical assistance.
Despite the initial drive by the Brazilian government and business actors (Cabral et al.
2016), this paper places the emphasis on the agency of the GoM in the mechanisation pro-
gramme, especially as Brazilian players gradually retreated from implementation and GoM
took the lead in setting up CSAs, allocating machinery and producing guidance on service
delivery (Cabral 2019).
The entrepreneurial CSA model – new ‘wine’ …
The CSA model was devised by the Fundo de Desenvolvimento Agrário (FDA), the govern-
ment’s implementing agency for the programme. Its core idea involved establishing agri-
cultural service centres that would provide services to farmers for a fee. Two types of
service provision channels were envisaged: public CSAs, managed by governmental enti-
ties, including state-owned enterprises, agronomic research stations and penitentiaries;
and private CSAs to be managed by private agribusinesses and associations and to
provide services to local farmers on a fee-for-service basis.
The advertised novelty of the programme concerned the privately managed centres
and the provision of a range of services, which besides mechanised farming operations
would eventually include selling of agricultural inputs, storage and agro-processing facili-
ties, extension services and market information for farmers. Once fully developed, the
centres would cover a range of agricultural inputs and services required for farming,
post-harvest storage, processing and commercialisation, as state farms once had. Mozam-
bique’s high potential farming areas were selected as main destinations for the new
machinery. Within these, the centres were expected to provide mechanisation services
to farmers without their own machinery but with the financial capacity to pay the fees
for services.
The programme aimed to assist the transformation of peasant agriculture while
increasing food production. When launched in 2014, the president of FDA announced
it would help the small-scale, peasant or family sector drop rudimentary farming practices
and equip it with modern means to reduce drudgery and time spent on land preparation,
assisting the transformation of subsistence peasants into commercial farmers, while
meeting national food production targets (FDA 2014).
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GoM issued competitive bids for private CSAs in 2015–16, calling for young entrepre-
neurs with agricultural training, business entrepreneurs, private societies, farmer associ-
ations and private service providers, with preference to those already established in the
districts where the centres would be located (FDA 2015). They would set up business
units to manage the machinery, which would eventually expand to offer the full range
of agribusiness services. Successful applicants would have the financial capacity to pay
upfront 5% of the price of the machinery and would then enter a leasing contract with
the government for 10 years and pay annual interest of 10%. By 2018, 69 privately
managed CSAs were set up across the country. These typically featured zinc-roofed ware-
houses to lodge the tractors (Figure 4).
… in old ‘bottles’ – bureaucratic control and its limits
Despite the emphasis on the entrepreneurial (privately managed) CSAs, this mechanis-
ation programme was largely a state endeavour, with a distinctive bureaucratic logic
(as discussed further ahead in relation to how the PPP was seen by the state). Indeed,
the selection of machinery preceded the identification of service providers, let alone
their needs. The machinery package allocated to CSAs was uniform across the country.
Tractors, ploughs, harrows and other equipment had the same characteristics in terms
of dimension, power or capacity, and had been centrally selected and then allocated
by FDA. Whereas farmer associations with limited financial capital typically bought only
tractors, disc ploughs and heavy disc harrows (often one of each item), private CSA man-
agers were compelled to acquire the full set of tractors and implements,12 even if they did
not need all items.13 Private CSAs were in effect treated as state-like enterprises, managed
as businesses but steered and controlled by government. Whilst promoting a model of
Figure 4. Zinc-roofed warehouse at a private CSA, Malema district. Source: Photo taken by the author,
Malema, July 2018.
12Which included chisel ploughs, lime and fertilizer spreaders, weeders, trailers, trailed boom sprayers and trailed seed
planters.
13While doing fieldwork, I observed situations where items bought under the programme remained wrapped and
untouched in their boxes, one year on from their arrival.
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privately managed services, the government intended to keep a hand on decisions such
as defining machinery allocations and setting the terms of service provision, including
fees to be charged and population to service.
Furthermore, the distribution of machinery and training of tractor drivers was carried
out by SOTEMA, a Maputo-based service company specialising in farming machinery and
contracted by FDA to assist the overall programme from its headquarters in the Mozam-
bican capital. Whereas MECANAGRO had during the earlier socialist period managed the
tractor fleet, this was now in the hands of a private company, though this was subcon-
tracted by the GoM to provide services during the machinery’s one-year guarantee.
And yet, the GoM’s control over the programme had its limits. For example, despite the
initial intention to establish CSAs of medium and large size (of 30 and more tractors), none
of the CSAs bought more than eight tractors. Not enough Mozambican entrepreneurs had
responded to the call and there had been difficulties in distributing the machinery across
all districts, as the GoM had initially envisaged. Part of the machinery ended up thus being
sold to individual farmers, who would themselves unexpectedly emerge as service provi-
ders, as I discuss later in the paper.
Also, despite the government’s attempt to keep service provision under scrutiny, this
proved challenging. As explained by some of my GoM respondents,14 CSAs were expected
to provide services to the peasantry and contribute to food production alone. In practice,
however, the capacity to verify whether these aims were being achieved was limited – as
observed during fieldwork in Chókwè and in Nacala, monitoring officers from agricultural
district departments lacked the means to visit CSAs and perform their duties. The simi-
larities with unsuccessful attempts to control state farms back in the old days were striking.
The following sections document the experiences of CSA managers, other service provi-
ders and farmers in search of services. Although the analysis does not claim to be represen-
tative of the entire country, the evidence presented illustrates how realities on the ground
contrast with the idealised model and intents of the GoM. It also indicates how the govern-
ment’s mechanisation programme is appropriated by business entrepreneurs and farmers
alike and feeds distinct but concurrent processes of accumulation and differentiation.
PPPs for mechanisation services and accumulation from above
PPPs were the GoM’s novel proposition for agricultural mechanisation, which aimed to
transform and modernise peasant farming (through seemingly paternalistic provision of
services and definition of food production targets) while nurturing a new class of agricul-
tural entrepreneurs. Yet, such aims were in tension with one another. I discuss this by ana-
lysing the profile of CSA managers, their motivations and understandings of the
partnership (vis-à-vis the GoM’s expectations). I also illustrate how the mechanisation pro-
gramme assists accumulation from above.
Private CSA managers, their drivers and ambitions
Managers in the eight private CSAs visited included one farmers’ union, medium to large-
scale farmers and private companies operating in agricultural production, processing and
14Interview with FDA (Maputo, March 2018) and with district government official (Ribáuè, July 2018)
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agribusiness services (Table 1). It is worth describing in some detail who these managers
are in order to appreciate their motivations in relation to the mechanisation programme.
One key aspect to consider is the managers’ class position. Except for the farmers’
union, all other private managers were selected based on their financial capacity to
repay the loan and availability of infrastructures to lodge the machinery. These character-
istic and, for those with direct farming activity, the reported size of their land (cf. Table 1)
indicate that these managers come from affluent strata in the district. Their reported con-
nections with local and central government and aid-funded projects confirm their rela-
tively privileged status.
Of all eight CSAs visited, the farmers’ union was the only case where a zinc roof ware-
house for storing the machinery was not available. Access to existing physical infrastruc-
tures gives an illustration of enduring connections with the state and insertion in the
networks of public funding and aid projects. For example, the manager of the centre in
Namialo had worked as civil servant in the Ministry of Agriculture and as manager in
aid-funded projects; he used the facilities of the National Forum of Cotton Producers (pre-
viously built with aid funds), over which he presided, as the location for the CSA centre.
Most, if not all, private managers in Chókwè had a history of connections to government
and aid projects, which is unsurprising in a district that has over the years been an impor-
tant target for public funding and investments in agriculture.
Besides these locally established managers, there were also newcomers in this sample
of eight centres. These included a Maputo-based service company, which set up a CSA in
Chókwè using the new premises of the state company Complexo Agroindustrial do Chókwè
(CAIC).15 Also, the CSA in Ribáuè was purposely erected and managed by a Brazilian entre-
preneur new to farming; this was one of the largest CSAs in terms of newly erected
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physical infrastructure.16 The international tobacco processing company SONIL was
already operating in Malema district (with contract-farming arrangements with local
small-scale tobacco producers and its own tractor fleet to service them), but the CSA con-
stituted a new, if secondary, activity.
So, what were these CSAmanagers’ drivers and ambition? When GoM launched the call
for private CSAs, it expected prospective managers to be driven by the prospect of
running a profitable business. The subsidised cost of the machinery and attractive
leasing conditions, coupled with the need for machinery for their own farming and
businesses, made this a relatively low-risk investment for many.
But ambitions varied somewhat among CSAmanagers interviewed. For the manager of
the CSA in Monapo, participation in the programme meant an extension of the already
established machinery rental business. For two private managers in Chókwè, the machin-
ery was essential for their own farming development plans and their agribusiness advisory
services to other medium-scale farmers in the area. The farmers union entered the pro-
gramme to provide services mainly to its members.
The manager in Ribáuè had ambitious plans, which suggest how mechanisation gets
entangled with land politics, business speculation and international capital. Having
obtained a number of land concessions adding to a total of 1000 hectares, this
manager was in the process of securing tenure rights17 for an additional 10,000 hectares
for maize and soybean production, which is significant for a part of the country (the
Nacala corridor) with noteworthy land disputes (UNAC and GRAIN 2015). The centre
was indeed a parallel initiative to his core business, which would eventually be focused
on large-scale soybean and maize production for export markets, with the South
African company Pannar Seed Ltd. (now part of one of the largest seed multinationals
DuPont Pioneer) as one named partner. For his own farmland, he had bought 2 bulldozers
to prepare the terrain and start production in 600 ha of the overall area in the 2017/18
season. As for the CSA, it would ensure stable access to inputs at competitive prices, as
the centre would stock from Pannar Seed Ltd. and other companies for the whole district.
In one case, original plans had already failed. The centre managed by Agri-arena had
been established to service an area of 4000 hectares inside the Chókwè irrigated zone.
Envisaged clients were small farmers in contract farming arrangements with CAIC,
expected to be a stable clientele. Yet, CAIC went bust less than a year after its inaugura-
tion. Agri-arena’s initial plans failed, and the company just about managed to keep its
machinery busy, ploughing 500 hectares in the 2016/17 season.
The motivations of SONIL in relation to the programme were intriguing, as the machin-
ery procured under the FDA programme could not be used to service its network of
tobacco outgrower farmers. For the duration of the lease, the machinery was authorised
by the GoM to operate in food crops alone. This may partly explain failure to reach annual
targets for serviced areas for the newly acquired machinery: 480 of 700 hectares in 2016/
17 and 272 of 1200 hectares in 2017/18. SONIL expected GoM would eventually wave the
16In addition to newly built warehouses, plans for future developments included two silos, training and accommodation
facilities and a shop for agricultural inputs and advisory services.
17Land in Mozambique is owned by the state. Local communities have automatic rights to use the land and, according to
the Mozambican law, no formal title is required to secure their customary rights. Outside investors can apply for land
concessions provided local communities have been consulted and agreed to the concession, in which case a land use
title is granted by the relevant authorities to the investor.
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rule that tractors could only plough for food crops. This would allow the company to use
the newly procured fleet to service the 4000 hectares of its 15,000 outgrowers.18 Perhaps
this expectation was what had driven the company to enter the lease contract and take on
the CSA business in the first place. Until then, the company did not regard tractor service
provision as business per se but rather as corporate social responsibility which ensured a
smooth relationship with government.
Given the diversity of actors and interest mobilised by the GoM’s mechanisation pro-
gramme, looking at CSAs simply as service provision centres (not exactly successful, as the
remainder of the paper will further illustrate) would be to overlook the multiple dynamics
at play, which concern also land access, connections with international agribusinesses,
capture of state resources, and the management of relations with local government
and communities, as will become clearer by considering interpretations of what the
PPP entailed.
How the PPP is interpreted by government and its private partners
The formal terms of the PPP were stipulated in the contractual terms of the partner-
ship. The GoM supplied the machinery (at subsidised prices) under a leasing contract
and provided training on machinery handling and maintenance for drivers and oper-
ators as well as one year of technical assistance. In turn, CSA managers run mechan-
isation services as a private business and repay their lease to the state. They would
eventually take ownership of the equipment once they had fully repaid the lease. In
practice, however, the partnership involved additional unwritten expectations and
transactions.
Whereas private CSAs were assumed to run independently as profit-oriented
businesses, there was an expectation by the GoM that CSAs would contribute to the gov-
ernment’s policy objectives, including serving the small-scale sector and contributing to
national food production targets. Government officials in district offices of agriculture
were responsible for monitoring whether the centres were servicing the population
and hence contributing to the overall aims of the policy.
The tension between the objective of servicing many small farmers and ensuring CSAs
remained profitable and financially sustainable was felt by the CSA managers. They com-
plained that the average small farmer cultivated land that was not suitable for tractor
ploughing, and that, because they were geographically disperse and located in hard to
access areas, fuel costs made service provision overly expensive.
Besides these tensions, there were also ambiguous interpretations of the partnership
on either side. The GoM acknowledged that CSAs were privately managed and that it
was up to their managers to ensure their machinery renting business was profitable.
And yet managers were often reminded of their obligations towards the peasant popu-
lation and vis-à-vis national food production goals. This passage from an interview with
a district official is illustrative.
The government cannot interfere in the business plan of the centre. (…) But there are con-
tractual directives that require managers to provide services to peasant farmers. Regardless of
how much the CSA manager increases its own production area, it has to have at least 1 or 2
18Interview with SONIL manager, Malema (July 2018).
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tractors available for the population. (government official, Maputo, July 2018, author’s
translation)
Although the leasing contract does not include any specifications about obligations
towards a particular target group, government officials interpreted the partnership in
this manner and their role as one of steering and controlling business.
Some CSA managers’ interpretation of the partnership also extended beyond the
written leasing contract. For example, securing access to land for expanding production
depended on maintaining a good relationship with local communities and authorities.
The performance of a public service type of function towards the community served
such a goal. For established companies, corporate social responsibility towards the com-
munity was, it seems, a temporary commitment, performed half-heartedly. Once the lease
was paid, they would be free to use the machinery where they wanted and would no
longer be pressured to service food growing small-scale farmers.
Overall, the zinc roof model envisioned by the GoM turned out to be inadequate to
meet the mechanisation programme’s stated objectives of servicing and transforming
the average small-scale farmer. Instead, it served to manage relations with local govern-
ment and local communities (particularly for international companies and investors) and
it offered further opportunities for accumulation (of land, infrastructures and capital) for
the relatively affluent farmers and business entrepreneurs.
Service access challenges and accumulation from below
From the point of view of the intended target group (the small-scale, peasant or family
sector), private CSAs were regarded as an extension of the state and therefore expected
to perform the same provision function the government was understood to have vis-à-
vis the population. After all, government officials had toured the country announcing the
new mechanisation policy for food production. People had been asked at public rallies
to contribute to government-defined food production goals as a national cause and, there-
fore, presumed they would get help from government in return for supporting the cause.
They therefore expected tractors and equipment to become accessible to them. The small
farmers interviewed did not seem to view CSAs as private businesses since the programme
had been introduced to them as a state-led initiative directed to the peasant population.
And yet they had little hope that the programme would benefit them.
The remainder of this section considers the challenges faced by the average Mozam-
bican farmer in accessing mechanisation while highlighting an additional channel for
service provision not envisaged in the government’s strategy. The latter illustrates a par-
allel process of accumulation prompted by the state-led mechanisation programme.
The challenges of small-scale tractorisation
The typical farmer in the family sector cultivates marginal land with an area often under 1
ha. Equipped mostly with a hoe, land preparation is a major constraint. Yet, because small
farmers’ land is often uneven and dotted with stones, roots, stumps and anthills, tractor
ploughing is challenging and there is a high risk of damaging the equipment. This is par-
ticularly problematic under this programme as spare parts and repair services are
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centralised by SOTEMA in Maputo. One of the CSA managers explained that he used to
send someone ahead to check the plot and if the land was not sufficiently cleaned, he
would ask the farmer to remove stones and stumps before doing the job. He also con-
ceded that he prioritised clients he knew had clear and ready to plough land that was
easy to access – this would normally be farmers cultivating lands which had been pre-
viously cleared, such as former colonial plantations turned into state farms during the
socialist period and now mainly in the hands of the affluent few.
Besides the challenging topography, another commonly reported challenge con-
cerned the dispersion of plots. The maximum distance of travel reported by managers
was 15–20 km. One manager noted, however, he had refused to move his machinery
15 km to plough one hectare, as the service would have been too small to cover for trans-
port costs, paying the tractor driver and making a profit. Another manager explained how
he had encouraged farmers to mobilise neighbours needing of service to make the dislo-
cation worthwhile. In such cases, larger distances of 30–40 km would be travelled to
service a group of farmers.
Service costs typically comprise fuel, the salary of the tractor driver/operator, spare
parts and maintenance. CSA managers complained that rises in fuel prices had squeezed
profit margins, discouraging service to small and distant plots. SONIL had already
adjusted to this situation by excluding fuel from the service fee and asking clients to
supply fuel themselves. This procedure also aimed to address the problem of clients mis-
reporting distances to their farm and size of their plots at the time of service request.
As for peasant farmers, the inability to pay for services was a problem. This is unsurpris-
ing given the low income of the average Mozambican family in the countryside (Smart
and Hanlon 2014). Some farmers were only able to pay for service fees after harvest
and, in the first year of the programme, some CSA managers agreed to this. Yet,
payment defaults in the first year led some to abandon this practice. Hence, for the
average peasant farmer access to mechanisation is challenged not only by the character-
istics of their land and their dispersed location, but also by the difficulty of paying for ser-
vices upfront. One interviewed farmer noted that peasants are always named as the target
group in government policy discourse, and yet they remain ‘barefoot’ and excluded from
the modernisation process, as policies are in practice not suited to their needs.19
In response to some of these challenges, local government officials in the Nacala cor-
ridor encouraged farmers to move out from their original areas of cultivation and set up
block farms,20 as farmers had in the past been directed to move into communal villages
and join collective farms. Yet, CSA managers in the corridor expected that larger farmers
would eventually arrive in the area and guarantee the right clientele to make mechanis-
ation services a profitable business. In the meantime, service provision to medium-sized
farmers with more than 10 hectares and locally established agricultural companies was
taking place. In one instance a CSA manager hired out the entire fleet of tractors to
OLAM, an international company that managed a large cotton outgrower scheme in
Nampula, during the peak moment of the land preparation activities. Meanwhile small
farmers complained they were serviced late or not at all.21
19Interview with farmer (Malema, July 2018).
20Interview with district government official (Ribáuè, July 2018).
21Interviews with farmers (Chókwè, March 2018 and Ribáuè and Malema, July 2018).
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Yet, some peer-to-peer mechanisation services were being provided by individual
farmers who had been brought into the programme, as the following section
describes.
Under the mango tree: unintended mechanisation channel and accumulation
from below
Due to the shortage of bidders for private CSAs, the GoM ended up extending the pro-
gramme’s credit facility to individual farmers across the country and 53 such farmers
bought tractors and implements for their own farms (typically one tractor and plough
each).22 For them, the leasing conditions comprised an upfront payment of 50% of the
value and repayment over a five-year period at the rate of 10%. These were small- to
medium-scale farmers with 5-to-60 hectares of land, growing maize, beans and horticul-
ture, as well as rice in Chókwè.23 They already owned some machinery. As they had no
physical infrastructure to keep the machinery, they typically parked tractors and equip-
ment under the shade of a large mango tree, a feature of Mozambican homegardens
(Figure 5). As these farmers also started to provide mechanisation services to monetise
surplus capacity of their newly acquired machinery, I call theirs the ‘mango tree’
channel as opposed to the ‘zinc roof’ channel of private CSAs.
I interviewed three of these tractor-owning farmers who explained that, when they
finished work on their own plots, they serviced other farmers to generate income to
help with repayment. They reported travelling a maximum distance of 15–20 km to
service individual farmers (as private CSAs did) or longer distances when servicing clusters
of farmers. Yet, because each of these individual tractor-owning farmers were spread
around in the district (and not concentrated in one centre), they were in principle able
to reach out to the scattered farms.
While private CSA managers mentioned not knowing their clients well,24 these tractor-
owning farmers used their kinship and social networks to mobilise clients. These clients
were, by nature of these networks, of relatively small size. Reported service fees
charged were equivalent to those practiced by CSAs. Yet, because of their social networks,
these farmers were willing to offer flexible conditions – including in-kind payments – and
be more accommodating with regards to payment delays. One of these tractor-owning
farmers noted that the previous year’s harvest had been bad and many of his clients
had failed to pay for services delivered. Yet, because he knew them well, he was
confident that they would soon be able to pay their debts.
Although this study did not look extensively at the experiences of individual tractor
owners across the country, the evidence collected suggests that, compared to private
CSAs, they may be better placed to reach the average farmer (Table 2). And yet, recalling
the analysis by Harris (1980), these emerging farmers are not to be idealised as the
bottom-up, peasant-based alternative for mechanisation. They are themselves enmeshed
in the complex class stratification and social differentiation.
22Interview with FDA (Maputo, March 2018).
23Interview with FDA (Maputo, March 2018).
24One of the companies explained it interviewed clients (farmers demanding services) in order to find out about location,
size and characteristics of their farm sites.
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Indeed, these unintended service providers have, through almost accidental access to
the GoM’s mechanisation programme, accumulated wealth and are gradually differentiat-
ing from the average peasant. By comparison with the relatively affluent and capitalised
CSA managers, the medium-scale farmer interviewed in Ribáuè epitomises a parallel
process of ‘accumulation from below’ which the GoM’s mechanisation programme has
equally assisted. Besides the two tractors, which this farmer used in his farm and for
Figure 5. Tractor under the mango tree, Chókwè district. Source: Photo taken by the author, Chókwè,
March 2018.
Table 2. ‘Zinc roof’ and ‘mango tree’ service provision channels compared.
Dimension of
comparison Zinc roof Mango tree
Typical clients Prioritisation of farmers with large and cleared
farming plots, located in accessible areas;
cases reported of renting machinery to large
companies located in the district.
Family members, neighbours and friends,
largely small-scale farmers with capacity to
pay for service (after harvest).
Client identification
and selection
Social and business networks (other medium to
large-scale farmers and companies); small
farmers interviewed for assessment of plot
conditions.




Service delivery to small farmers often not
regarded as business but as corporate social
responsibility, done to maintain good
relations with local government officials.
Service delivery to small farmers regarded as
means to generate income to help
repaying lease, as well as peer-to-peer
solidarity, particularly in relation to
payment conditions.
Payment conditions Farmers complain conditions are prohibitive –
initial practice of payment after harvest
abandoned by CSAs after experiencing
delays in payment.
Payments in kind practiced and kinship and
social networks working as insurance of
payment mechanism.
Accumulation pattern From above – tractors offer accumulation
opportunities (including land access) for
affluent medium and large-scale farmers,
agribusinesses and large agricultural
(national and international) companies.
From below – tractors offer accumulation
opportunities for small to medium local
farmers embedded in local networks.
Source: Author’s own table.
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servicing his peers, he owned a small mill and shop for agricultural inputs in the village.
Tractor services were a means to obtain relatively inexpensive grain for the mill and there-
fore in-kind payments at harvest may have been a kinship-grounded concession but were
also a convenient form of payment.
Conclusion
The mechanisation strategy recently pursued by the GoM illustrates historical contin-
gency concerning agricultural policy and agrarian change in Mozambique. It also illus-
trates how the push for mechanisation is fundamentally political in that it embodies a
particular understanding of agricultural development (centred on a linear pathway
towards modernisation) and nurtures uneven patterns of accumulation and social differ-
entiation, with winners and losers.
The current mechanisation wave has commonalities with the experience of the early
years of the socialist regime, immediately after Independence. Although this latest wave
is set in a different political and economic context (and a new language of PPP and fees
for service), the same dualistic understanding of agrarian structures and paternalistic atti-
tude towards the farmers are discernible. The socialist government viewed agriculture as
a dual systemmade of state farms and the peasant sector, and the former as the production
base for the latter’s development, operating in a co-operative fashion. The current vision
sees private agribusinesses as the motor of development, although government guidance
is needed to oversee the transformation and modernisation of the peasantry.
The currentmechanisation programme also echoes the past inability (or lack of desire) by
the state to discern the complex reality of social relations and differentiation within the pea-
santry, and of patterns of resource capture and private accumulation within state farms. The
PPP embodied by the zinc- roofed CSAs assumed managers were focused on the mechanis-
ationbusinessalone, overlookingulteriormotives for takingonCSAmanagementandbuying
the programme’s machinery, even when they do not need it. And, yet, the GoM urged man-
agers to operate in ways that undermine the financial viability of their businesses. This was
because the nature of these centres and the machinery that equipped them were not
suited to the conditions facing the average farmer, the presumed target of the programme.
Yet, the programme generated, unintentionally perhaps, another route for service pro-
vision that seems relatively more attuned to the reality of Mozambican agriculture, the
mango tree channel. Emerging small-to-medium individual farmers who bought tractors
and ploughing equipment not distributed to CSAs are themselves taking on the role CSAs
were expected to perform, reaching out to the small, rugged and dispersed farmland of
the average farmer. And they too are able to appropriate resources in a parallel process of
accumulation.
Both the zinc roof and the mango tree channels are the product of historical contin-
gency and the expression of social differentiation. Zinc roofed CSAs mingle old-style
state dirigisme with the new language of business and PPPs. Mango tree farmers epitom-
ise the emergence of capitalised small- to medium-scale farmers with capacity to offer
mechanisation services to their peers and thereby expand their agricultural production
and commercial activities.
The complexity of the agricultural politics and agrarian dynamics depicted here high-
lights the shortcomings of studies and debates on mechanisation that are exclusively
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centred on the achievements and failings of individual interventions, or on the type of tech-
nology or model of service provision that is, ceteris paribus, economically rational. As Berry
noted, technological choices are embedded in specific local configurations of economic,
political, and social change, which make interventions subject to modification and unex-
pected effects.
Not all themes identified by this study were developed in this paper. One such theme
concerns the stakes of large agribusiness companies directly or indirectly involved in the
mechanisation programme (such as Pannar Seed and OLAM), and their connections with
the state more broadly. The extent to which the CSAs, sponsored by public and aid
resources, are creating the infrastructure and technological networks that will ease the
penetration of international agribusiness across the Mozambican territory, as well as tech-
nological grabbing, is an issue that deserves further investigation. Another issue that
deserves attention concerns the role of farmer unions and cooperatives in mediating
small farmers access to mechanisation. Finally, there is scope for interrogating the
global push for mechanisation and its connection with new politics of development
cooperation (Scoones et al. 2016). The fixation with tractors and tillage that pervades
state and aid bureaucracies overshadows discussions of alternative technological path-
ways that consider the needs of different social groups, the nature of labour relations,
as well as the ecological implications of deep soil tractor ploughing.
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